## The accession of China to WTO : The Consequences for the Regional Gap

Jean Louis Brillet, INSEE, France Muriel Jakubowicz, Chloé Mayer, Julia Schutz, ENSAE students

Liu Xiaoyue, National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing

#### Outline of the presentation

- The model
  - The behavioral equations
  - The trade flows and regional issues
- The problem : WTO accession
  - Present issues : the agreement decisions
  - Future issues : the economic framework
- The results (decisions)

## The model : summary

- Two regions : the coast and the interior.
- Three products : primary, secondary and tertiary.
- Identified internal and external trade flows.
- A decomposition of trade according to competitiveness elements.
- Calibrated behavioural equations, using an error correction framework



## The regional decomposition

- The two regions could be three
  - If we include the western ones (+Mongolia?)
  - This would make the system more complex
  - These regions have a rather minor weight (except maybe XinJiang)
  - But they are essential to the gap issue
  - As their development level is much lower

## The products

- Three products : primary, secondary, tertiary.
  - Primary : Agriculture, Fisheries, Mines
  - Secondary : Manufacturing, Construction.
  - Tertiary : Market Services.
- Reasons : economic (formulations), statistic (data).
- Trade : applies to 1 and 2 only
- Production : specific formulations for 1, 2, 3
  - Mines = problem



### The trade flows

- Three zones : 2 regions + rest of the world
- 6 trade flows (for 2 products)
- We start from a priori shares
- We correct them by relative changes in
  - price competitiveness
  - available capacities
  - transport capability

### The trade flows

- Price competitiveness
  - local price for the region
  - "export" price for the "exporter"
  - uses its cost (major role) and the price on the targetted market, with a unitary elasticity
  - corrected by the exchange rate if needed
- Available capacity
  - same logic as prices
  - Rest of the world: infinite capacity, exogenous cost

## The trade flows depend on :

#### • Transportation capacity

- index, base value = 1
- increases with the potential (infrastructures, frequency, reliability, speed)
- capability and not cost (separate assumption)
- one for each direction (but the assumptions should be linked, of course)



- Calibrated behavioural equations
  - against estimation at an aggregated level
  - (which works more or less)
- Values are based on :
  - Another single product –single region model
  - Other models
  - Economic theory
  - Local issues
- We use an error correction framework (it works)
- Long run steady state solution

- Same formulations across regions
- Similar formulations across products
  - Except for the production function
  - 1 = Exogenous, 2= Cobb-Douglas, 3 = no capacity
- We define both intermediate and final demands (simplified I/O matrix)
  - No intermediate consumption of services

- Error correction in all cases
- Production factors : investment and labour
  - Complementary factors or Cobb-Douglas
- Unemployment : labour and working age population
- Value added deflator : cost and output gap
- Wages : WS-PS
- Exports deflators : margins (+), competitors price
- Demand, production and imports deflators : identities

- Household consumption: revenue, Δrevenue, unemployment, inflation
- Trade at constant prices : see above

$$va_{i,j} + \sum_{k} ic_{i,j,k} = \sum_{k} fdm_{i,k,j} + \sum_{k} ic_{i,k,j}$$

## The problem : WTO accession

- The direct effects of the agreement
- A reduction of tariffs
  - applied in China to imports from the rest of the world.
  - applied in the rest of the world to Chinese imports.
- A reduction of quotas
  - applied in China to imports from the rest of the world.
  - applied in the rest of the world to Chinese imports.
- A reduction of price subsidies (later)

## Other possible issues

- Policy : a decrease in the firms' social contributions rate or in taxes on profits.
- A devaluation or revaluation of the Yuan.
- External : An increase in capital or / and labour productivity.
- An ex ante increase in productive investment.
- An increase in the scrapping rate.

## A reduction of foreign tariffs : global results

- We suppose Chinese exporters leave their own price unchanged
- Exports increase by less than 1%
- followed by GDP, final demand and imports.
- Demand : investment, intermediary goods for both local and foreign demand
- Short term supply bottleneck
- Long term price increase -> competitiveness
- Real trade : +0.6%

#### Shock A : Decrease in foreign tariffs Graph 1 : Global variation of supply and demand



#### Shock A : Decrease in foreign tariffs Graph 2 : Trade and State balances



















## A reduction of foreign tariffs : regional results

- Exports : Assumptions on the region of origin
- The coast profits the most (twice?)
- The secondary product profits the most
- At any horizon

## A reduction of foreign tariffs : regional results

- Imports : The coast is the most affected
- It loses the most on both markets
- To both the interior and the Rest of the World
- At any horizon, for both products

## A reduction of foreign tariffs : regional results

- On the whole
- Value added grow more on the coast
- Order : Secondary, Primary, Tertiary
- Employment : higher relative growth on the coast (relative weight of the secondary sector)
- But the lower labour productivity in the interior profits to employment, in absolute variation.
- But not to household revenue and consumption

## A reduction of Chinese tariffs : global results

- The mechanisms are more complex
- Now prices and rate of use are directly affected
- Imports increase immediately
- But capacity effects and competitiveness limit the loss
- More and more as inflation decreases

# A reduction of Chinese tariffs : global results

- The decrease in inflation comes :
- Directly through cheaper imports
- And indirectly through CPI, wage rate, wage cost and value added deflator
- Export competitiveness increases
- But not the terms of trade
- Profitability reduces the long term rate of use

# A reduction of Chinese tariffs : global results

- The budget revenue decreases (the only ex ante effect apart from price subsidies)
- The trade balance recovers in real terms
- But not in current terms (disinflation affects more the export price)

#### Shock B : Decrease in local tariffs Graph 1 : Global variation of supply and demand



#### Shock B : Decrease in local tariffs Graph 2 : Trade and State balances













#### Shock B: Decrease in local tariffs Graph 8: Prices 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 → Value added deflator $\rightarrow$ Local demand deflator → Wage rate -1 -1.2 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 1 46 51

## A reduction of Chinese tariffs : regional results

- The regional evolution is also complex
- The imports share is higher for coastal demand so the ex ante loss is higher
- But the prices are more affected
- And the higher profitability creates investment and capacity
- The gains in trade shares to both Rest of the World and interior makes the coast lose less

## A reduction of foreign quotas : global and regional results

- Results are similar to a change in tariffs
- Especially with unitary elasticities
- They would be different with actual decisions

## A reduction of Chinese quotas : global results

- Same as tariffs but no ex ante change in prices
- Prices do decrease, but from the ex post optimising behaviour of firms
- And also from unemployment and wages
- Disinflation and freed capacities favour exports
- The effect is worse than tariffs from the first, and does not improve
- The ex ante effect is divided by two, again

## A reduction of Chinese quotas : regional results

- The higher deflation increases the ex post competitiveness gains for the coast
- And exports grow more
- Global results are very close.

#### Shock T: Combined decisions Graph 1 : Global variation of supply and demand

![](_page_46_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### Shock T: Combined decisions Graph 2: Trade and State balances

![](_page_47_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### Shock T: Combined decisions Graph 3: Export to value added ratio 0.9 0.8 0.7 - Exports 1, coastal - Exports 2, coastal 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.10 11 16 26 21 31 36 41 1 6 46 51

![](_page_49_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_50_Figure_0.jpeg)

### General conclusion

- The direct effects of WTO are globally favourable, except for the State budget (tariffs)
- More for the coast, still a little for the interior
- Almost each individual decision favours the coast
- □ So WTO accession should widen the gap
- This should be increased by FDI, or technology transfers.

### General conclusion

- The gap could be reduced by policy decisions
  - An autoritary increase in local investment
  - Incitations such as tax rebates
  - The development of transportation (double edged)
- This can be studied by our model
- We shall develop these features shortly.
- Along with a rural / urban decomposition