Modeling OPEC Production

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http://www.bu.edu/cees/readmoreRK.html



Important Questions

What is the nature of OPEC as an organization? How do prices affect OPEC production? Are production decisions asymmetric?

Opec Supply Behavior

Competitive Behavior--Positively sloped Demand Curve

Cartel Model---Control output to raise prices

Target Revenue Model--Limited Absorptive Capacity

Property Rights Model--Uncertainty about future ownership

Empirical Analysis

 $Ln Q_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_i \ln P_t + \beta_i Q_{it}^{OO} + \varepsilon_{it}$

 $\gamma_i > 0$ Competitive behavior $\gamma_i < 0$ Non-competitive behavior $\beta_i = 1, \gamma_i = 0$ Constant market sharing $\beta_i = 1, \gamma_i \neq 0$ Market sharing $\beta_i > 0, \gamma_i \neq 0$ Partial market sharing

Griffin, J.M. 1985, Opec behavior: a test of alternative hypotheses American Economic Review 75(5) 954-963

Previous Results

Results

γ generally is negative β generally is non-zero

Implicit Assumptions Variables cointegrate Price is independent variable, production is dependent variable These assumptions are rejected Methodology: Step 1 Expand Equation

 $\operatorname{Ln} Q_{t} = \alpha + \gamma \operatorname{ln} P_{t} + \beta \operatorname{ln} Q^{OO}_{it} \lambda \operatorname{Behavior} + \varepsilon_{it}$

Behavioral variables Quota Installed capacity Reserves

Methodology: Step 2 Estimate Cointegrating Relationships

Test for cointegration

Estimation Technique DOLS (Stock & Watson, 1993) VECM (Johansen, 1991)

Methodology: Step 3 Estimate Short-Run Dynamics

Exogenous vs endogenous Is error correction term for DOLS estimate zero? Are error correction terms in VECM equal to zero?

Methodology: Step 4 Test for Asymmetry

Decompose DOLS Residual $^{+}\mu_{t} = (\Delta \text{Variable} > 0) * \mu_{t}$ $^{-}\mu_{t} = (\Delta \text{Variable} < 0) * \mu_{t}$

Estimate error correction model $\Delta Q_{t} = \alpha + \gamma * \mu_{t-1} + \gamma * \mu_{t-1}$

Test symmetry hypothesis $\gamma' = \gamma'$

Results: Is Production Exogenous?

Both ADF and lambda statistics indicate cointegration
Error correction term associated with lagged residuals from DOLS estimate are statistically significant
One or more of the error correction terms in the production equation of the VECM are statistically significant

Results: Do OPEC Nations "Obey" Quotas

	β	$\beta = 1$		
Indonesia	0.079	1.60		
Iran	1.00	1.42		
Libya	1.24	2.52		
Nigeria	0.656	2.63		
Saudi Arabia	0.942	1.66		
UAE	0.482	172.7		
Venezuela	0.54	3.22		

Values in red reject null hypothesis at p < .05

Results: How Do Prices Affect OPEC Production?

	β	Utilization Rate
Indonesia		0.91±0.04
Iran		0.87 [±] 0.13
Libya	0.100	0.86 ⁺ 0.13
Nigeria	0.258	0.93 [±] 0.09
Saudi Arabia	3.349	0.74 [±] 0.11
UAE	2.686	0.82 [±] 0.10
Venezuela	0.137	$0.86^{+}0.11$

Values in red reject the null hypothesis at p < 0.05

Methodology Are OPEC Decisions Asymmetric?

	Price		Quota	
Indonesia	-0.09	-0.84	_	-
Iran	-0.85	-0.51	_	-
Libya			-1.28	-0.46
Nigeria				
Saudi Arabia				
UAE				
Venezuela				

Values in yellow are γ Values in red are γ

General Finding

•OPEC is an effective cartel that influences production by assigning quotas

- •Higher oil prices are an incentive to most OPEC nations to increase production
- There is some evidence that production responses are asymmetric

What Will You Hear At Future LINK Meetings?

What determines OPEC quotas?What determines installed capacity?